Approved For Release 2000 CA29: CIA-RDP79S01011A001000050007-7 SECURITY INFORMATION

April 16, 1953

visions for SE-43 will result in a widespread belief in Japan and that the major barrier to normal political and economic relations in Asia will have been removed, Therefore, new opportunities will be created for both the Communist bloc and the West in competing for influence in Asia. The degree to which continuation of the Indochina war will undermine the Communist peace posture in Asia will depend importantly, on the Communist ability to foster the Asian belief that it is a "colonial" war and not an instrument of Communist imperialism. While no fundamental shift in the alignment of Asian states is to be expected, a Korean truce would probably create serious problems for the National Government of China and the Republic of Korea. In Japan, while the alignment with the US would continue, there would be strong pressure for the expansion of economic and political relations with Communist China and the USSR. In Southeast Asia, the neutralist governments of Burma and Indonesia would probably support Chinese Communist efforts to gain UN membership; little the Manner land when the Manner for Mortage for the membership; little to the Manner for Manner for Mortage for the Manner for Manner for Manner for the Manner

9. Modify 2nd sentence to read:

"Japan would be much more receptive to Communist trade offers following a Korean armistice particularly if no other alternative presented itself to ease the serious economic consequences following an anticipated reduction in American military expenditures." DOCUMENT NO. _

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. [☐ DEGLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S (C) NEXT REVIEW DATE: _ AUTH: HR 70-2 DATE: 3 FEBR '81 REVIEWER: 018557

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Page 2, para 2, 1st sontance - Add at end:

in the peace campaign, which serves to accentuate the divergency of the views of the Western nations on the relative importance of individual problems.....

(Then rest of paragraph).

Page 3. para 3. 4th and 5th sentences - Delete and substitute:

*If however, the U. S. in consultation with its allies, and while maintaining a pasture of military readiness, could originate concrete proposals for the selection of various issues; or, failing that possibility, appeared willing to negotiate on Communist offers, the non-Communist world would almost certainly remain responsive to U. S. leadership. In the first event the Communists might be just in the position of having to make real concessions to support their peaceful posture, or of refuning to negotiate Western proposals, which in time butwould serve to strengthen non-Communist unity and purpose. In the second, such U. S. action would probably lessen the chances of a serious division of opinion between the U. S. and the other Western powers, which is almost certainly a primary size of the new Communist tectics.

Page 5, para 6 - Add at end:

"Under such circumstances the U. S. might be open to Communist inspired charges of intransigeance from its allies, associates, and the nautral nations, unless a agreed Western position had been previously decided and presented."